

**LOWELL DECL. EX. 9a**

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SHABTAI SCOTT SHATSKY, *et al.*

Plaintiffs,

- against -

THE PALESTINE LIBERATION  
ORGANIZATION and THE PALESTINIAN  
AUTHORITY,

Defendants.

Case No. 18 Civ. 12235 (MKV) (DCF)

**EXPERT DECLARATION OF RONNI SHAKED**

**I. INTRODUCTION**

**A. Credentials**

My full name is Ronni Shaked. Since 2012 I have served as a Principal Research Associate in the Harry Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. In 2015, I was appointed Head of the Middle East unit at the Truman Institute. I currently dedicate most of my time to conducting academic research and consulting on Palestinian-related issues.

Between 1969 and 1982, I worked for the Israeli Security Agency (the “ISA”),<sup>1</sup> the Israeli government intelligence and investigatory agency responsible for combating terrorism in Israel and in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. I held a number of positions during my service with the ISA, including: Commander of the Jerusalem Sector, and Commander of the Ramallah Sector. I specifically dedicated a year of my service in the ISA to the study of terrorism and the development of theories aimed at defeating it in the West Bank and Gaza, in addition to the development of theories and procedures for the defense of Israeli targets in other countries. Throughout my years of work with the ISA, I handled agents who operated within terrorist organizations, I participated in and conducted interrogations of terrorist operatives, and I participated in and commanded operations intended to defeat terrorist operations. I was also responsible for intelligence-related functions such as collecting and analyzing evidence.

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<sup>1</sup> The ISA is also sometimes known as the Shabak or Shin Bet, which are, respectively, an acronym and the initials of its name in Hebrew (*Sherut haBitachon haKlali*).

From 1982 until 2013, I worked as a commentator and analyst for the newspaper with the largest distribution in Israel, *Yedioth Ahronoth*, where I wrote about Palestinian affairs, terrorism and Islamic fundamentalist organizations and security-related subjects. As a member of the editorial board, I wrote hundreds of articles, almost all of them about Palestinian and terrorism related issues.

During my tenure at *Yedioth Ahronoth* I interviewed many important members of designated Palestinian terrorist organizations. I also interviewed Palestine Liberation Organization (“PLO”) and Palestinian Authority (“PA”) leaders such as Yasser Arafat, Mahmoud Abbas, Muhammed Dahlan, Jibril Rajoub and Marwan Barghouti.

From 2004 through 2006, I conducted many interviews of terrorists in Israeli prisons. The majority of the terrorists whom I interviewed had dispatched other terrorists to perpetrate terrorist attacks, suicide attack or had commanded terrorist operations. I also interviewed potential suicide bombers, who had been arrested before carrying out a terrorist attack, as well as others who had been wounded, but not killed, during the course of the attack.

In order to confirm my findings and my research, I cross-reference sources of information by, for example, interviewing sources in different and competing Palestinian organizations. Similarly, I conduct interviews with Israeli and Palestinian security sources in order to authenticate information, and I rely on official written reports by the Israeli and Palestinian security establishments.

I have a Bachelor’s degree in Middle Eastern Studies from the Hebrew University. I have a Master’s degree (*summa cum laude*) in Middle Eastern Studies, with a focus on fundamental Islam, suicide attacks and Palestinian Islamic organizations, from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

I have a Ph.D. in Middle Eastern and Social Psychology, with a focus on the psychological aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, from the Hebrew University. My dissertation was “The Palestinian Society’s Ethos of Conflict.”

I have provided expert declarations or reports in United States federal courts in the following civil cases:

- *Ungar v. Islamic Republic of Iran*, 211 F. Supp. 2d 91 (D.D.C. 2002)
- *Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran*, No. 01-cv-1655 (D.D.C. 2003)
- *Stern v. Islamic Republic of Iran*, 271 F. Supp. 2d 286 (D.D.C. 2003)
- *Haim v. Islamic Republic of Iran*, 425 F. Supp. 2d 56 (D.D.C. 2006)
- *Strauss v. Crédit Lyonnais, S.A.*, No. 06-cv-702 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)
- *Weiss v. National Westminster Bank Plc*, No. 05-cv-4622 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)
- *Linde v. Arab Bank Plc*, No. 04-cv-2799 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
- *Gill v. Islamic Republic of Iran*, No. 15-cv-2272 (D.D.C. 2017).

- *Weinstock v. Islamic Republic of Iran*, No. 17-cv-23272 (RNS 2018).
- *Baxter v Islamic Republic of Iran*, No 11-cv-2113 (D.D.C. 2018)
- *Steinberg v. Islamic Republic of Iran*, No. 17-cv-1910 (D.D.C. 2019)

I have offered testimony at deposition, hearings or trial in the following civil cases:

- *Ungar v. Islamic Republic of Iran*, 211 F. Supp. 2d 91 (D.D.C. 2002)
- *Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran*, No. 01-cv-1655 (D.D.C. 2003)
- *Strauss v. Crédit Lyonnais*, No. 06-cv-702 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)
- *Weiss v. National Westminster Bank Plc*, No. 05-cv-4622 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)
- *Linde v. Arab Bank Plc*, No. 04-cv-2799 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).
- *Baxter v. Islamic Republic of Iran*, No. 11-cv-02133 (D.D.C. 2018).

I have authored or co-authored five books:

- Ronni Shaked and Aviva Shabi, Hamas: From Belief in Allah to the Path of Terror, Keter Publishing House, Jerusalem (1994).
- Ronni Shaked and Shlomo Harari, Capucci, Yedioth Ahronoth Books, Tel Aviv (1995).
- Ronni Shaked, On the Fence: The Palestinians in Israel: National Radicalism, Carmel, Jerusalem (2012).
- Ronni Shaked and Botun Mas'ud, From Jerusalem to Damascus and Back: An Intelligence Agent Behind Enemy Lines, Lavie P. Enterprise Publication, Jerusalem (2012).
- Ronni Shaked, From Behind the Kaffiyeh – The Conflict from the Palestinian Perspective, Yedioth Ahronoth, Tel Aviv (2018). The book was a bestseller and won a prestigious award in Israel.

I have made the documentary film “For the Sake of Allah” (2006) dealing with fundamentalist Islam, especially Hamas and its suicide terror attacks.

Between 2012-2018 I have written, directed and edited six documentary films dealing with Palestinian terrorism in Gaza focused on Hamas.

I have also served as an expert consultant for several documentaries relating to Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist organizations, including:

- “Collaborators” (1995)
- “The Army of Roses – Women Suicide Bombers” (2002)
- “The Engineer of Death” (2003)
- “To Die in Jerusalem” (2008).

I have worked as a consultant for many governmental entities, including the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation, the United States Department of State, and the United States Department of Justice. From 1991-2001, I also served as a consultant to the Anti-Defamation League.

I have served as a commentator on Israeli television and radio. I have also served as a commentator on Arabic-language television stations, such as Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya and Al Hura. I also appeared as a regular commentator for the broadcast radio channel *Radio Lelo Hafsaka*.

Since 1988 until the present I have been invited to lecture officers of the Israel Defense Force (the Israeli army) on numerous occasions as an expert on Middle East terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism.

I have been invited to give briefings on Palestinian terrorism to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, (senior staff briefing, January 1996); to U.S. Senator Evan Bayh, (1999, four-hour briefing); to the Extra-Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee (London 1999); to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (in 1997 and 2000); to the United States State Department (1992); to the Anti-Defamation League (1991-1995); and, at the request of the United States Embassy in Israel, to various embassy staff and visiting U.S. government officials.

I was invited to lecture on Palestinian terrorism and Hamas at the International Security and Defense Institute (May 2000) and at McGill University, Montreal (1997).

I have served as an advisor on Palestinian terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State of Israel; to the Israeli Police; and to the Office of the United States Attorney, Middle District, Florida - Special Committee on Islamic Jihad (2000).

As part of my professional work and research I frequently interview and speak with operatives and members Palestinian terrorist groups, and exchange information with American, Israeli and Palestinian security and intelligence officials. I also frequently have access to documents and evidence gathered by Israeli and American intelligence and law enforcement agencies, including statements and confessions made by captured operatives and members of terrorist groups. My knowledge of and familiarity with the matters discussed herein is based on the expertise I have developed during many decades of on-going research, study and publishing. My methods of research and formulating conclusions are widely accepted and relied upon by other experts and scholars who research, study, publish and teach the Palestinian-Israel conflict generally, and Palestinian terrorism in particular.

I am fluent in spoken and written Hebrew, Arabic and English, and qualified to translate between these languages.

I received a fee in the amount of \$150 per hour for the time that I spent working on this declaration. I confirm that I do not have any connections or relationships –

whether professional or personal – with any of the parties or the witnesses in this trial, which would prevent me from giving impartial evidence.

## **B. Nature and Purpose of Report**

I have been asked by the attorneys for the plaintiffs in the above-captioned case to provide an expert declaration on matters related to the Popular Front of the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the terrorist attack at issue in this case, as set forth below.<sup>2</sup>

## **C. Background About the PFLP**

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (الجهبة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين, or PFLP) is the third-largest Palestinian organization in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the second-largest faction within the PLO. The Popular Front was founded on December 11, 1967, by Dr. George Habash. The ideology of the Popular Front combines nationalism and Marxism. The final objective, as the Popular Front sees it, is the liberation of Palestine; the validity of that objective is considered by the Popular Front to be axiomatic and indisputable, and accordingly the struggle is long-term.<sup>3</sup>

The entire purpose of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine is armed struggle and the establishment of a democratic and socialist Palestinian state. The destruction of Israel is not viewed by the Popular Front as a religious or merely national struggle, but rather as a broader revolution against the imperialist West. The elimination of Israel is a means to the expulsion of imperialism from the Middle East and the eradication of the reactionary Arab regimes. The color red is a prominent component of the Popular Front emblem. The color red and the hammer reflect socialist ideology; the rifle, which also appears in the Popular Front emblem and on its posters, symbolizes the armed struggle against Israel.

The Popular Front has toned down its position over the years. Nonetheless, after the signing of the Oslo Agreements, to which it objected, it broke away from the PLO, and only in 1999 did it rehabilitate its relationship with Yasser Arafat. In recent years, the Popular Front has basically accepted the two-state vision, but without waiving the right of return for the Palestinian refugees. On the tactical level, the Popular Front prefers grandiose operations which attract the attention of international public opinion to the Palestinian issue.

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<sup>2</sup> The expert report dated February 14, 2013, that I provided in the previous action by the plaintiffs against the defendants, addressed the involvement of the PFLP and Ra'ed Nazal in the February 16, 2002, bombing. Plaintiffs' counsel have informed me that they are presenting other evidence regarding these matters in this case, and that I need not address these topics in this declaration, but that I should assume for the purpose of this declaration (consistent with the opinion I set forth in my report) that the PFLP carried out the attack.

<sup>3</sup> On the Popular Front and its ideology, see Matti Steinberg, *Facing their Fate: Palestinian National Consciousness, 1967-2007* [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv, Hemed Books, 2008), pp. 93-115; and Eli Galia, *George Habash - Political Biography Ideology and Politics in the Struggle for Palestine* [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv, Resling, 2017), pp. 175- 207.

The ideology of the Popular Front is based on that of the Arab Nationalist Movement (al-Qawmiyun al-Arab, الْقَوْمِيُّونَ الْعَرَب).<sup>4</sup> The Arab Nationalist Movement was founded at the American University of Beirut following the defeat in the 1948 War. At that time, a group of students and academics formed under the leadership of George Habash and Wadie Haddad.<sup>5</sup> Subsequently, the Popular Front was founded. The central questions which preoccupied the members of the group concerned the Israeli-Zionist threat, the relations between the Arabs and the West, and the future character of the regimes in the Arab countries.<sup>6</sup>

The ideology of the Arab Nationalist Movement was shaped by the reality of the Arab world during the years 1948 to 1961.<sup>7</sup> The Arab Nationalist Movement espoused the cause of the unification of the Arab world on the basis of solidarity, democracy, and economic and social development. It believed that the unity of the Arab nation would lead to Arab liberation from Zionism and imperialism and the elimination of the State of Israel, which the members of the movement considered as a foreign entity, planted in the heart of the Arab world. The elimination of the barriers between the various Arab states would assist in the formation of an Arab bloc which could withstand the Jewish State – a state which threatened the entire Arab nation, and not only the Palestinians. The objective of the movement's members was to establish a Palestinian state on the entire territory of Palestine, on both banks of the Jordan River, East and West, following the dismantling of the State of Israel.

The Arab Nationalist Movement viewed Israel as a total enemy, the spearhead of Western imperialism in the Middle East, through which the West was seeking to re-establish its rule in the area. The socioeconomic structure of the future united Arab state, as the Arab Nationalist Movement saw it, would be socialist, popular, revolutionary and democratic. The union would be achieved after the struggle for liberation from the bonds of imperialism and the healing of the wounded national pride.

While the Arab Nationalist Movement maintained a presence in the Palestinian territories before 1967, its ideology was pan-Arab.<sup>8</sup> The establishment of the PLO and Fatah, and especially the 1967 War, shifted the focus to the Palestinian arena. George Habash and his colleagues switched their emphasis from pan-Arabism to the Palestinian struggle. Habash established the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine by uniting a number of leftist Palestinian organizations, which combined a Marxist-Leninist ideology with Palestinian

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<sup>4</sup> Moshe Shemesh, *The Arab National Renaissance* [Hebrew] (Beersheba, Ben-Gurion University, 2012), p. 190.

<sup>5</sup> Kazziha, Walid, *Revolutionary Transformation in the Arab World: Habash and his Comrades from Nationalism to Marxism*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975, p. 18.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 47.

<sup>8</sup> See Mustafa Kabha, *The Palestinians: A People in Dispersion* [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv, Open University), pp. 176-177, 223-225.



nationalism. Since its inception, the organization has supported armed struggle and a national war of liberation as the solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.<sup>9</sup> In recent years, ideological disputes have led a number of groups to split off and break away from the Popular Front. In its first years, the Popular Front perpetrated a series of terrorist operations, principally involving the hijacking of aircraft. In one of these, an American TWA plane was hijacked in August 1969. The Popular Front also collaborated with the Japanese Red Army in carrying out the massacre at Lod Airport on May 30, 1972. The Popular Front was supported by Syria. In November 1988, the Popular Front participated in the Palestinian National Council, which accepted United Nations Resolution 242; subsequently, the Popular Front established the Refusal Front. The organization took part in the first intifada. The PFLP openly criticized the Oslo agreements, but most of its leaders and commanders returned to the Palestinian territories after the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1994.<sup>10</sup> During the 2000-2005 al-Aqsa Intifada (also known as the “Second Intifada”), the PFLP prominently carried out a number of special terrorist operations, including the assassination of the Israeli Minister of Tourism, Rehavam Ze’evi. The PFLP also carried out suicide bombings during the Second Intifada, including the bombing that is the subject of this case.

In May 2000, George Habash withdrew from the leadership of the PFLP for reasons of health. Abu Ali Mustafa, who was selected to replace him, came to the West Bank and settled in Ramallah. On the basis of his involvement in terrorist operations, he was eliminated by Israel in August 2001. After his death, the military arm of the Popular Front was renamed in his honor the “Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades.” His successor, Ahmad Saadat, led the Popular Front in the assassination of the Israeli Minister of Tourism, Rehavam Ze’evi, in revenge for the elimination of Abu Ali Mustafa. Ahmad Saadat was arrested by Israel and sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment.

In 2000, Abu Ali Mustafa stated in an interview to the Al Jazeera network:

“We believe that our conflict and our struggle with Israel are a strategic matter, which is not subject to any consideration whatsoever. Even if there are conditions under which a peace arrangement could be discussed, we do not consider that as either an arrangement or peace. We believe that the Palestinian people, which is in exile on one hand and under occupation on the other, has the right to struggle by any means, including armed struggle, because we believe that the state of conflict is what is constant, and what may change is the methods and the tactics. That is our policy.”<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Kabha, *ibid.*, p. 224. See also Guy Bechor, *PLO Lexicon* [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv, Ministry of Defense 1995), p. 124.

<sup>10</sup> Guy Bechor, *ibid.*, pp. 127-128.

<sup>11</sup> Al Jazeera Television, May 10, 2000.



## II. EXPERT OPINIONS

### A. The PA And PLO Provided Material Support and Resources to the PFLP Which Facilitated the February 16, 2002, Bombing

The basis and reasons for my opinion are as follows:

#### Background

During the June 1967 Six-Day War, Israel captured the West Bank and the Gaza Strip from Jordan and Egypt, respectively. Between 1967 and 1994, Israel exclusively governed the West Bank and Gaza (first through a military government and later through a Civil Administration). However, beginning in 1994, pursuant to the series of agreements between Israel and the PLO known as the Oslo Accords, Israel began “redeploying” (i.e., removing all its security forces and civilian personnel) from Palestinian population centers (i.e., cities and villages) in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Oslo Accords also provided for the creation of the Palestinian Authority, which was established in 1994. Governmental powers in the areas evacuated by Israel, including security and police authority, were turned over to the Palestinian Authority. Under the Oslo Accords, the West Bank is divided into three governmental regions: Area A, consisting of the major Palestinian cities (Ramallah, Jenin, Tulkarem, Nablus, Qalqilya, Bethlehem and Jericho) in which the Palestinian Authority has full security and civil powers; Area B, consisting of over 400 Palestinian villages, in which the Palestinian Authority has police powers and full civil authority; and Area C, which is populated mostly by Israelis and governed by Israel.<sup>12</sup>

By early 1996, Israel had completed the vast majority of these withdrawals. The cities of Area A, including Ramallah, Jenin, Tulkarem, Nablus, Qalqilya, Bethlehem and Jericho, containing 26% of the Palestinian population in the West Bank, and the villages in Area B, in which lived another 70% of West Bank Palestinians, had come under Palestinian Authority control. By March 2000, Israel completed two further, smaller redeployments, as the result of which Area A covered over 18% of West Bank territory, and Area B covered another 21% of the West Bank.<sup>13</sup>

Under Israeli legislation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the PFLP was (and still is) designated an illegal organization, and its activities were (and are) barred as illegal. Until 1994, Israeli security forces and law enforcement authorities were able to enforce the ban against the PFLP and its activities throughout the West Bank and Gaza, and as a result its

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<sup>12</sup> The Gaza Strip (which in any case since 2007 has been governed by Hamas) and the city of Hebron were subject to special arrangements under the Oslo Accords, which are not relevant here.

<sup>13</sup> See *The Third Phase of the Further Redeployment Process: Legal Aspects*, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (June 18, 2000), available at [https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFA-Archive/2000/Pages/The%20Third%20Phase%20of%20the%20Further%20Redeployment%20Proc es.aspx](https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFA-Archive/2000/Pages/The%20Third%20Phase%20of%20the%20Further%20Redeployment%20Process.aspx) (last accessed Oct. 1, 2021).

ability to carry out terrorist attacks was very limited. The same was true for other Palestinian terrorist organizations. However, as Israel withdrew from the Palestinian population centers in the West Bank and Gaza, the Palestinian Authority permitted and assisted the PFLP (and other terrorist organizations), to organize and operate in the geographical areas (i.e. Areas A and B) that came under Palestinian control. As a result, the size, strength and operational abilities of the various Palestinian terrorist organizations in the West Bank and Gaza, including the PFLP, grew enormously after Israel withdrew from Area A and Area B.<sup>14</sup>

### **Provision of Support**

Needless to say, terrorist organizations such as the PFLP require a physical, geographical “safe space” in which to organize, recruit and operate. That safe space, which was denied to the PFLP under exclusive Israeli rule of the West Bank and Gaza Strip between 1969-1994, was provided to PFLP by the defendants.<sup>15</sup> During the years prior to the February 16, 2002 bombing, the defendants permitted the PFLP to operate offices in at least five of the seven cities within exclusive Palestinian Authority jurisdiction in the West Bank – namely, Qalqilya, Ramallah, Nablus, Jenin and Tulkarem – and funded those offices as well.<sup>16</sup>

The PFLP’s serious *need* for that funding is evidenced in the documents provided by the defendants regarding their funding of the PFLP’s office in Qalqilya. On January 30, 2000, Tayseer Qubaa, a senior PFLP leader, addressed a letter to Yasser Arafat and asked him to approve the amount of 4,000 dinars for the rental of the building for the Popular Front in Qalqilya, “**in light of the financial situation of the Popular Front, of which you are well aware...**”<sup>17</sup> Soon after that, a contract was signed between by the PFLP and Muhammad Zaid (the landlord), for the rental of a “general office” for the organization in the city of

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<sup>14</sup> As a result, beginning in 1994, the size, scope, frequency and sophistication of Palestinian terror attacks against Israeli targets increased dramatically.

<sup>15</sup> The Palestinian Authority’s full control over Area A and its extensive control over Area B effectively ended only after Israeli launched operation “Defensive Shield” on March 29, 2002. The trigger for that operation was a suicide bombing at a Passover seder on March 27, 2002, at the Park Hotel in the city of Netanya, in which some 30 celebrants, mostly elderly, were killed. During Defensive Shield, Israeli forces operated throughout Area A and Area B for an extended period, destroying the terrorist infrastructure that had been created during the years of exclusive Palestinian control, and arresting thousands of terrorists. Since that time Israel has exercised freedom of movement in Area A and B as necessary. Prior to Defensive Shield, however, Israel left Area A to the exclusive security control of the Palestinian Authority (with the exception of a small number of brief and geographically limited forays by Israeli security forces, as the Second Intifada intensified).

<sup>16</sup> See the deployment of Popular Front offices in 2001-2002 listed (along with contact information) in the authoritative PASSIA business directory. SHATSKY-003288-90; SHATSKY-003291-93. See also the September 11, 2012, deposition testimony of Nadime Barahme at p. 28.

<sup>17</sup> This letter appears in Defendants’ Bates No. 07:000041. Qubaa’s request clearly indicates that the cost of renting the office was a heavy one for the Popular Front, which, at the time, was in economic difficulties.

Qalqilya, in consideration for 4,560 Jordanian dinars. The contract entered into force on June 1, 2000.<sup>18</sup>

On July 6, 2001, Tayseer Qubaa wrote to Sami al-Ramlawi, the Director General of the Palestinian Ministry of Finance at the time, in a letter in which he asked for the continued payment of the rent on the building which was used by the Popular Front in Qalqilya, in accordance with the instructions by Arafat.<sup>19</sup> These requests apparently prompted PA Ministry of Finance officials to handle the transfer of the rent to the landlord, and the Ministry of Finance issued a check in the amount of 4,560 dinars to the order of Zaid. Additional documents show that the landlord received a full exemption from taxes and other imposts on his income from the rental of the building to the Popular Front.<sup>20</sup>

These documents show, therefore, that the PFLP had a significant need for this financial support due to its “financial situation,” and that the defendants’ leader, Yasser Arafat, personally approved the monetary support to the PFLP.

By allowing to the PFLP to operate offices throughout PA territory, and by funding those offices, the defendants significantly enhanced the PFLP’s ability to operate in general, and to carry out terrorist attacks specifically. Without offices, it would have been extremely difficult for the PFLP to exist and operate as an organization; having offices in PA jurisdiction allowed the PFLP to spread propaganda, hold meetings, recruit members, employ and train staff and plan and execute its activities. The PFLP would have had virtually no organizational existence or operational capabilities (including the capability to plan and carry out terrorist attacks) but for those offices. Indeed, there is abundant evidence, from the convictions of various PFLP terrorist operatives, that during this period the PFLP used its offices in the West Bank - the same offices funded by the defendants - specifically to recruit terrorists, and to provide funding to terrorists.<sup>21</sup>

The defendants facilitated the February 16, 2002 attack in additional ways. Between 1999 and through February 16, 2002, the PLO provided a car, driver, and apartment for Abdel Rahim Malouh, who was the PFLP’s Deputy Secretary-General and as such the second-most senior official in the PFLP.<sup>22</sup> In this way, the PLO subsidized Malouh during the three year

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<sup>18</sup> Defendants’ Bates No. 000042.

<sup>19</sup> Defendants’ Bates No. 07:000040.

<sup>20</sup> Defendants’ Bates Nos. 07:000035; 07:000038; 07:000039.

<sup>21</sup> See e.g. Verdict dated November 5, 2003, in Case No. 41430/01 (Judea) Prosecutor v. Fares Barghouti and Verdict dated December 1, 2008, in Ser.Crim. Case 7027/06 (Jerusalem) State of Israel v. Gholmeh; Decision dated December 9, 2001, in Misc. Mot. 7344/01 (Jerusalem) State of Israel v. Ibrahim Ayubi; Sentencing Decision dated July 6, 2010, in Serious Crim. Case (Beersheva) 1088-08 State of Israel v. A.A.; Verdict in Case No. 6358/03 (Samaria) Prosecutor v. Nuraddin Said Daoud (Titan); Appellate Decision dated October 27, 2004, in Appeal No. 57/04 (Judea and Samaria), Hassan Judeh v. Prosecutor.

<sup>22</sup> See transcript of the deposition of Abdel Rahim Malouh, September 5, 2012, at pp. 12-13, 36-37.

period prior to the bombing, and allowed him to carry out his PFLP activities full-time, and without financial distractions.

The defendants' support for Malouh was especially critical to the operations of the PFLP during the months immediately preceding the February 16, 2002 bombing. That is because in October 2001, following the PFLP's assassination of former Israeli minister Rehavam Ze'evi, the leader of the PFLP, Ahmed Saadat, became a fugitive and his ability to run the PFLP was limited. That effectively left Malouh – financially supported by the PLO – as the senior official running the PFLP during the 4 months prior to the bombing.<sup>23</sup>

Additionally, and no less importantly, between January 2000 and February 2002, the PA paid a salary to Ra'ed Nazal (as a Captain in the PA National Security Force) while it knew full well that Raed Nazal was in fact serving as the head of the PFLP's "military" (i.e. terrorist) activities in Qalqilya.<sup>24</sup> Ra'ed Nazal served as a member of the Central Committee of the Popular Front and was in charge of the PFLP, including its military arm, in Qalqilya.<sup>25</sup> Ra'ed Nazal was the Secretary of the Popular Front organization in Qalqilya and was selected for that position by its institutions.<sup>26</sup> A PA General Intelligence (GIS) report dated February 8, 2002<sup>27</sup> states that Ra'ed Nazal was "a member of the Central Committee of the Popular Front, a fellow traveler of Abu Ali Mustafa,<sup>28</sup> and the person responsible for the military arm of the Popular Front in Qalqilya."<sup>29</sup> The report goes on to state that Nazal "is a member of the Popular Front and is armed." The report adds that, in the estimation of the GIS, Ra'ed Nazal is "a brave and daring person." Defendants' files on Ra'ed Nazal indicated that he was responsible, *inter alia*, for the weapons of the Popular Front in Qalqilya.<sup>30</sup>

It is important to realize in this context that the Popular Front is (and was) a tightly run, disciplined and hierarchical organization. This strict organizational culture is part of the PFLP's general dedication to the fine details of its Marxist/socialist ideology and worldview. For example, the head of the PFLP, Ahmed Saadat, was personally involved in deciding which individual PFLP operatives should be involved in terrorism, and which specific attacks

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<sup>23</sup> Malouh himself was arrested by Israel in June 2002.

<sup>24</sup> Defendants' Bates No. 07:000189; 07:000206; 07:000055 through 07:000062

<sup>25</sup> On the central role which he played in the Popular Front and in its military wing, see documents from his personal GIS file, Defendants Bates No. 07:000187, dated December 10, 1999; Defendants' Bates No. 000178, "Security check dated February 8, 2002."

<sup>26</sup> See <https://pflp.ps/post/7993/الذكرى-السنية-الثانية-عشر-لاستشهاد-قائد-كتائب-أبو-علي-مصطفى-بقلقي> (last accessed Oct. 1, 2021); Defendants' Bates No. 000187-191.

<sup>27</sup> See Defendants' Bates No. 07:000187-191.

<sup>28</sup> Secretary General of the Popular Front from 2000 until 2001.

<sup>29</sup> Raed Nazal was apparently "awarded" this rank upon his release from prison, following the Sharm el-Sheikh Agreement of September 1999; see Defendants' Bates No. 07:000206.

<sup>30</sup> Defendants' Bates No. 07:000192 - 07:000194.

should be carried out or not carried out.<sup>31</sup> Moreover, the February 16, 2002, bombing was not a simple terrorist operation. Aside from the fact that the attack took place in the heart of a Jewish community during a period when violence was widespread and security was tight, the Israeli Police crime scene report from the bombing shows that it was a sophisticated and well-planned bombing using a professionally constructed explosive device.<sup>32</sup> An attack of this type required the involvement of an organizational team.

By financially supporting the commander of PFLP terrorist activity in the Qalqilya region for two years prior to the bombing - thereby allowing Ra'ed Nazal to spend his time planning recruiting and training terrorists and planning and executing attacks – the defendants greatly increased the PFLP's ability to plan and carry out the February 16, 2002, bombing, whether or not Ra'ed Nazal was personally involved in that attack.

**B. The PA And PLO Knew, in the Period 2000-2002, That the PFLP Was Virulently Anti-Israel, Antisemitic and Anti-American, and Strongly Advocated and Was Involved in Terrorism Against Jewish Targets**

The basis and reasons for my opinion are as follows:

As is evident from the discussion, and the summaries of articles published by the PFLP's official magazine, *al-Hadaf*, between 1999 and 2002, included in Appendix 1 (attached to and incorporated into this Declaration<sup>33</sup>), the PFLP was strongly opposed to the peace process with Israel at that time and in favor of armed struggle – i.e., terrorism. The articles summarized in Appendix 1 contain numerous diatribes against Israel and the Jews, including articles denying the Holocaust and glorifying Palestinian martyrdom.

In addition, in the July 2001 issue of *al-Hadaf*, the PFLP published a detailed list of terrorist attacks which it perpetrated between October 2000 and June 2001, listing a total of 116 attacks in Israel and the West Bank. These attacks included shootings, mortar attacks, grenade attacks, and attacks using other explosive devices.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> See Verdict dated December 25, 2008, in Case No. 2958/06 (Judea) Prosecutor v. Ahmed Saadat; Verdict dated November 5, 2003, in Case No. 41430/01 (Judea) Prosecutor v. Fares Barghouti; Verdict dated December 1, 2008, in Ser.Crim. Case 7027/06 (Jerusalem) State of Israel v. Gholmeh; Sentencing decision dated September 11, 2001, in Ser.Crim Case 4028/01 (Jerusalem) State of Israel v. Saad Salameh.

<sup>32</sup> See Israeli Crime Lab Report dated March 13, 2002, File No. 649/02.


<sup>33</sup> Appendix 1 hereto was also attached to my February 14, 2013, expert report.

<sup>34</sup> See Appendix 1, Exhibit 1-L.

Thus, during the years leading up to the bombing, while they were providing the PFLP with the material support discussed above, the defendants were well aware that the PFLP was carrying out terrorist attacks, and seeking to carry out more such attacks.<sup>35</sup>

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on: October 3, 2021

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Ronni Shaked

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<sup>35</sup> Moreover, according to an August 28, 2001, U.S. State Department press briefing, a PFLP spokesman publicly threatened *American* interests. *See* U.S. Department of State Press Briefing (Aug. 28, 2001), available at <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2001/4661.htm> (last accessed Oct. 1, 2021).



**RONNI SHAKED - APPENDIX 1**

**I. The *al-Hadaf* Journal**

***1. Scope of Engagement***

I have been asked to provide my expert opinion on the Palestinian monthly called *al-Hadaf* and to determine whether *al-Hadaf* is the official mouthpiece of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine ("PFLP" or the "Popular Front"), belongs to the PFLP and is part of its public relations system.

***2. General Background***

I have studied the subject, reviewed material which is in my possession and material from the academic literature, and gone over Israeli, Arab and especially Palestinian press clippings which refer to the journal *al-Hadaf*. I have studied issues of the *al-Hadaf* journal and have read articles and news items that were printed in it.<sup>1</sup>

My many years of experience are based on my service with the Israel Security Agency, the 30 years during which I worked as a journalist for the newspaper *Yedioth Ahronoth*, as a correspondent in matters involving the Palestinians, and as a researcher at the Truman Institute of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where I study the ethos of the conflict in Palestinian society, with emphasis on each of the organizations within the PLO. I am aware of the subjective, manipulative and biased use which each faction and organization make of their newspapers and periodicals. Therefore, I do my best to study the periodicals and newspapers in a critical way, while relying on the knowledge and experience which I have accumulated over many years in the Palestinian area. As a general rule, I read the daily press on an ongoing basis; I also read Palestinian periodicals and journals – all in order to remain up to date, to learn about the political and public discourse of the organizations, and to learn about the feelings, ideology and changes which take place within them.

***3. Newspapers and Journals in the Service of the Palestinian Organizations***

The communications media constitute a tool for the dissemination of knowledge and the creation of awareness. Every organization and every social and political movement which seeks to disseminate its ideology and to expand its ranks must make use of the media. The ideal situation

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<sup>1</sup> I read issues of *al-Hadaf* at the Truman Library at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where its issues from its inception and up to the end of the 1980s are to be found. The issues starting at the end of the 1980s are to be found in the library of the Dayan Institute at Tel Aviv University. The issues of the last few years can be read on the Internet, on the *al-Hadaf* website.



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is that the social movement will have a communications medium of its own, in which it will be able to disseminate its ideology and maintain a system of delegitimation against its opponents.

Since the formation of the Palestinian organizations, each of them has established its own communications media and especially journals<sup>2</sup> as a tool for the dissemination of ideology, mobilization, motivation and the creation of a supportive environment. Thus, for example, as early as the beginning of the 1960s, the Fatah organization established the periodical *Filastinuna* – “Our Palestine”<sup>3</sup>; Hamas established a ramified media system of television stations; the Popular Front, the Democratic Front, and the *Tahrir* (“Liberation”) Party founded journals. The journal which was founded by the Popular Front is called *al-Hadaf*.<sup>4</sup> All of the Palestinian organizations, even the smaller and more ephemeral ones, have web sites.

The various organizations which comprise the PLO – including the religious faction, the national faction and the leftist, Marxist-national faction – are separated by profound ideological differences. Each of their communications media, each journal of each organization, disseminates and emphasizes its own ideology, including by way of comparison to the ideologies of the rival organizations. Each journal has its own symbols, its own authors, and its own pictures, as well as the background colors in which the journal is distributed. These outward signs constitute primary evidence of the organizational and political affiliation of the journal.

From my experience and on the basis of my study of the various journals of the organizations that comprise the PLO, it appears that the Palestinian organizations make similar use of journals, including the way in which they divide the journals into sections. Thus, for example, there are the following sections: Palestinian news; Arab news; international news; Israel news; military activity of the organization; the fallen, which includes biographies; general information about what is happening within the organization; editorial; literature and poetry; and sometimes even sports. In each and every such section, each journal makes sure to represent the ideology of the organization which it serves. The structure of the sections within the journals, which is more or less similar to that of the sections within the web sites of the organizations, makes it possible to compare the various concepts of the organization with its events, to identify more easily the organization to which the journal belongs and whether it is the official journal of the organization. It is only natural for each organization to focus on the news most closely related to the organization itself, to publish photographs of its commanders and leaders, and to publish reports on the protest operations, including those characterized by violence and terrorism, which it has carried out.

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<sup>2</sup> When I use the term “journal”, I am referring to daily, weekly and monthly newspapers and other periodicals.

<sup>3</sup> Mustafa Kabha, *The Palestinians: A People in Dispersion* [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv, Open University, 2010), p. 204.

<sup>4</sup> Kabha, *ibid.*, p. 223.

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As a general rule, the newspapers of organizations and political parties, and certainly those of the Palestinian organizations, do not conceal their political-ideological identity. Quite the opposite is true: they emphasize it. Even in the case of *al-Watan*, an underground newspaper which was distributed by the Communist Party in the Palestinian territories during the 1970s, the paper openly bore the name of the Communist Party. The front page of every journal features symbols of the organization, photographs of its commanders or photographs related to an event linked to the organization in question.

A frequently occurring component of journals consists of speeches, interviews or comments by leaders of the organization. The journals feature official news of the organization, cover all of the conferences and rallies, and include articles on operations which were carried out.

Palestinian society, both within and outside the Palestinian territories, can easily identify which organization a journal represents – not only according to symbols or after studying the content, but because of the many years of distribution which has transformed the journals into part of the landscape of political discourse. In Palestinian society, where the social networks are dense, the activists of the various organizations are well known in every village, every urban neighborhood and every refugee camp. In many cases, journals are distributed to the general public by activists of the respective organization. This is an additional sign attesting to the identity and affiliation of the journal.

#### **4. Methodology**

Holsti defined content analysis as any technique of making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristic of a message (Holsti, 1969).<sup>5</sup> The analysis in this study is qualitative analysis.

The methodology which I will use is founded on my professional experience, which is based on the period of my work for the Israel Security Agency; the experience which I gained in the course of my work as a journalist responsible for covering Palestinian society for the *Yedioth Ahronoth* newspaper; the experience and knowledge which I acquired during my studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem; and the research studies which I carried out at the Truman Institute of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

My examination of *al-Hadaf* issues was performed according to the following criteria:

- Content of journalistic articles.
- Symbols, pictures, posters.

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<sup>5</sup> Holsti, O.R., *Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities* (New York, Addison-Wesley, 1969).

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- The ideology which the journal publishes and represents.
- Official publications which appear in the journal.
- Content of articles which reflect an organizational affiliation or ideology.
- Use of code words.
- Photographs of leaders and general photographs.
- Death notices and eulogies for the fallen.
- Identification of the journal by the Palestinian public as the mouthpiece of the Popular Front.
- References to *al-Hadaf* by the official web site of the Popular Front.

***5. The name and logo of the journal***

The name of the journal is *al-Hadaf*, which means “The Target”. The target is the liberation of Palestine. Until the 1980s, the logo consisted of circles denoting a target. Below the circles appeared photographs of Ghassan Kanafani, a member of the political chamber of the Popular Front and the first editor of the newspaper, who was eliminated by Israel in 1972. Next to the name *al-Hadaf*, the following text appears: “The paper was founded by the author and martyr Ghassan Kanafani in 1969. An Arabic political [newspaper].” Above the name *al-Hadaf* appears the motto of the paper: “The whole truth for the masses”.<sup>6</sup> Since the 1990s, the picture of the target appears inside the Arabic letter *ha* in the name *al-Hadaf*, and the photograph of Ghassan Kanafani appears separately, on page 2.

Each of the issues of the periodical includes four pages printed in color: the cover page, the back page, the second page and the page before last. The pictures in dozens of issues which were examined reflect a number of central motifs: the delegitimation of Israel, pictures of leaders of the organization, and pictures of activities of the organization. Especially prominent are pictures from the time of the intifada, which reflect violent terrorist operations, or as the terrorists describe them, “résistance”. The majority of the pictures on the other pages of the journal principally consist of photographs of personages, generally Popular Front commanders, as well as photographs of terrorist squad members and photographs of events and conferences. Most of the pictures of the personages are of George Habash, Abu Ali Mustafa and Ghassan Kanafani.

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<sup>6</sup> Guy Bechor, *ibid.*, p. 81.

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***6. The date of issue of the periodical and the location of the editorial office***

The periodical was first published in 1969 in Beirut. During the 1990s, the editorial office was moved to Damascus, where it is located to this day, although the editor-in-chief lives in Ramallah.

Following are the addresses of the editorial office and the branch offices:

The main office is located in the Yarmuk refugee camp near Damascus. The address of the editorial offices is: P.O. Box 30192, Damascus. The telephone in Damascus, Syria is 0096311-6328267, facsimile 6319374.

The address of the office in Ramallah is: Clock Square, al-Midan Building, third floor, telephone: 02-2966808.

The address of the office in Gaza is: al-Saraj Tower, Information Office of the Popular Front, telephone: 08-2828291.

***7. The editor of the journal***

The present editor of the journal *al-Hadaf* is Omar Shehadeh, a member of the political chamber of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.<sup>7</sup> Omar Shehadeh also represents the Popular Front at various events, such as a Palestinian conference which took place in Paris in December 2012<sup>8</sup> or a Popular Front conference which took place early in 2013 in the town of Arabeih in Northern Samaria.<sup>9</sup> The editorial board includes Jawad Aqal, Yusuf al-Salibi, Ahmad M. Jabbar, Dr. Ahmad Abu Namus.

Jawad Aqal is a former resident of the village of Beit Reema near Ramallah. He is a member of the political chamber of the Popular Front and a former spokesman for the organization<sup>10</sup>; he also serves as a representative of the organization in Syria.<sup>11</sup> The first editor of the journal, Ghassan Kanafani, was a member of the political chamber of the Popular Front and a spokesman for the

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<sup>7</sup> <http://www.kataebabuali.ps/arabic/news.php?action=show&id=768>.

<sup>8</sup> See <http://www.alwatanvoice.com/arabic/news/2012/12/12/342365.html>.

See also <http://maannews.net/arb/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=546687>.

<sup>9</sup> <http://www.alhayat-j.com/newsite/details.php?opt=3&id=182088&cid=2690>.

<sup>10</sup> <http://www.beitreema.com/politicalhistory.html>.

<sup>11</sup> [http://ar.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%AA\\_%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%85%D8%A7](http://ar.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%AA_%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%85%D8%A7).

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organization. His successor, Bassam Abu Sharif, was a spokesman for the Popular Front a member of its political chamber.

### 8. *The al-Hadaf Website*

The journal *al-Hadaf* has a web site, <http://www.alhadafmagazine.com>.

The logo of the web site consists of photographs of leaders of the organization and a Palestinian flag, with the logo of the periodical on the right side of the design. In the picture are George Habash, Wadie Haddad, Abu Ali Mustafa and Ahmad Saadat.<sup>12</sup>

### 9. *Links to the official web site of the Popular Front*

1. The official web site of the Popular Front contains a link to the web site of *al-Hadaf* where issues of the journal can be read, and the web site of *al-Hadaf* contains a link to the web site of the Popular Front.
2. The English-language web site of the Popular Front, which includes a reference to the web site of *al-Hadaf*, states that *al-Hadaf* is the official magazine of the Popular Front.<sup>13</sup>



3. The official web site of the Popular Front, in a report on events which were held in memory of Ghassan Kanafani, the first editor of *al-Hadaf*, states that: "...the *al-Hadaf* journal is issued by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine...".<sup>14</sup>
4. *Al-Hadaf* also has a Facebook page. Its Facebook home page features a picture of George Habash against a red background; below the picture is the logo of the Popular Front, and below that is the following caption: "The voice of the Popular Front – official page".<sup>15</sup> The word *jabha* that appears in the URL of the Facebook page is the Arabic word for "Front".

<sup>12</sup> <http://www.alhadafmagazine.com/>.

<sup>13</sup> <http://pflp.ps/english/>.

<sup>14</sup> <http://www.pflp.ps/news.php?id=2800>.

<sup>15</sup> <http://www.facebook.com/pflp.jabha>.

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*Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine*

**صوت الجبهة الشعبية - الصفحة الرسمية**

**The Voice of the Popular Front - Home Page**

5. The print version of al-Hadaf has a link to the official website of the PFLP.<sup>16</sup>

***10. Other Publications Note the Links Between the Popular Front and al-Hadaf***

1. Wafa, the official Palestinian news agency, publishes a review of the Palestinian media. The section that discusses *al-Hadaf* states: “A journal which is published on behalf of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine”. Wafa is the official news agency of the PLO, an organization of which the PFLP is also a member. The official publication by Wafa constitutes proof of the relationship between the journal and the Popular Front and the PLO's knowledge of *al-Hadaf* and its substantive content.<sup>17</sup>

The Wafa agency notes that after the PLO left Beirut in 1982, “the Popular Front moved to Damascus, and from there it continued to publish its central journal, *al-Hadaf*, from the Syrian capital of Damascus”.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>16</sup> See *al-Hadaf* v. 1456, p. 1.

<sup>17</sup> See <http://www.wafainfo.ps/atemplate.aspx?id=5091>.

<sup>18</sup> <http://www.wafainfo.ps/atemplate.aspx?id=5091>.

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2. A publication which states that the *al-Hadaf* periodical is the official journal of the Popular Front. A publication in Syria concerning the detention of PFLP people stated that an order had been issued to close the official publication of the PFLP – *al-Hadaf*.<sup>19</sup>
3. A web site which is closely affiliated with the Popular Front, on the page devoted to Ghassan Kanafani, states that he was the first editor of the *al-Hadaf* journal of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.<sup>20</sup>
4. The web site “Arabs48”, which is published on behalf of the Israeli Arab party *Balad* and is considered to be a reliable site, has stated that the *al-Hadaf* journal belongs to the Popular Front. Admittedly, the full name of the organization, “Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine”, is not mentioned because “Arabs48” is an Israeli web site. However, the words *tahrir falastin* (“the Liberation of Palestine”) definitely constitute a “shorthand” reference to the Popular Front.<sup>21</sup>
5. On an additional occasion, in July 2012, the “Arabs48” web site wrote that *al-Hadaf* is issued on behalf of the Popular Front.<sup>22</sup>
6. The Palestinian site *Amad*, which belongs to the liberal faction, stated in an article on the Popular Front dated December 6, 2012, that *al-Hadaf* “is issued on behalf of the Popular Front”.<sup>23</sup>
7. The web site of the *al-Weehdat* sports club in Jordan, which is considered to be a Palestinian club, states that *al-Hadaf* is the journal of the Popular Front.<sup>24</sup>
8. A French web site which appears in the Arabic language also sets forth the direct relationship between the Popular Front and the journal *al-Hadaf*.<sup>25</sup>
9. The Sky News Network broadcast an Arabic-language program on Ghassan Kanafani, during which it was said that Kanafani was the editor-in-chief of *al-Hadaf*, which was founded by the Popular Front.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> <http://islamport.com/w/amm/Web/4175/61.htm>.

<sup>20</sup> <http://www.sndos.com/vb/showthread.php?t=15723&page=2>.

<sup>21</sup> <http://www.arabs48.com/?mod=articles&ID=97523>.

<sup>22</sup> <http://www.arabs48.com/?mod=articles&ID=92796>.

<sup>23</sup> <http://www.amad.ps/arabic/?Action=Details&ID=105214>.

<sup>24</sup> <http://www.alweehdat.net/vb/showthread.php?t=64652>.

<sup>25</sup> <http://www.langue-arabe.fr/spip.php?article785>.



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10. A biography of Ghassan Kanafani on the Palestinian Ministry of Culture's official website, states that the journal *al-Hadaf* was published by the Popular Front.<sup>27</sup>
11. The electronic newspaper *al-Balad*, which is published in the Emirate of Oman, states that *al-Hadaf* was established in order to serve as a tool for the Popular Front.<sup>28</sup>
12. A July 2012 report by Wafa, the official Palestinian news agency, reviewed the life of Ghassan Kanafani and stated that he was a member of the political chamber of the Popular Front and the editor of its journal, *al-Hadaf*.<sup>29</sup>
13. The arabnet5 web site also considers the periodical *al-Hadaf* as belonging to the Popular Front.<sup>30</sup>
14. The *al-Hiwar* ("Dialogue") web site, which is ideologically close to the Popular Front, published an article on the Palestinian exile, and among other things, mentioned that the journal *al-Hadaf* belongs to the Popular Front.<sup>31</sup>
15. Wikipedia directly links *al-Hadaf* to the Popular Front.<sup>32</sup> In another report, the Arabic-language Wikipedia site states that *al-Hadaf* is the chief journal of the Popular Front organization.<sup>33</sup>
16. The Palestinian web site *Shabab Filastin* states that after its founding, the Popular Front established its journal, *al-Hadaf*.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> <http://www.skynewsarabia.com/web/article/32218/%D8%BA%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%83%D9%86%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%B0%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%89-%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%87>.

<sup>27</sup> [http://www.moc.pna.ps/a\\_det.php?id=32](http://www.moc.pna.ps/a_det.php?id=32).

<sup>28</sup> [http://albaladoman.com/?page\\_id=445](http://albaladoman.com/?page_id=445).

<sup>29</sup> <http://www.wafa.ps/arabic/index.php?action=detail&id=134637>.

<sup>30</sup> <http://tags.arabnet5.com/%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9>.

<sup>31</sup> <http://www.ahewar.org/debat/show.art.asp?aid=120445>.

<sup>32</sup> [http://ar.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D9%83%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84\\_%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B5%D8%B1](http://ar.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D9%83%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84_%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B5%D8%B1).

<sup>33</sup> [http://ar.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9\\_%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86%D8%AE](http://ar.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9_%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86%D8%AE).

<sup>34</sup> <http://www.shabab.ps/vb/archive/index.php/t-138558.html>.

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17. The Arab historian, Dr. Kadhim al-Mousawi, who has written at least six books on the history of the Middle East, writes in his study on Ghassan Kanafani that the Popular Front was the organization which published the journal *al-Hadaf*.<sup>35</sup>
18. The newspaper *Misr el-Gdida* (“New Egypt”), which is published in Egypt, published an article by Muhammad Sadegh Ismail, a political commentator in Egypt, which stated that the journal *al-Hadaf* is a journal of the Popular Front. The article was published on June 17, 2012.<sup>36</sup>
19. The newspaper *al-Mawkef* (“The Position”), an official newspaper of the Palestinian authority, stated that *al-Hadaf* is the official journal of the Palestinian Authority.<sup>37</sup>
20. A web site which is closely related to the Popular Front and devoted to the fallen commanders of the Popular Front stated that the journal *al-Hadaf* belongs to the Popular Front.<sup>38</sup>

**11. Israeli attestations**

1. Dr. Guy Bechor, one of Israel’s most senior experts in Middle Eastern studies and the author of the book *PLO Lexicon*, states that “*al-Hadaf* is the journal of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, George Habash’s organization”.<sup>39</sup>
2. Prof. Moshe Shemesh, a scholar of Middle Eastern studies and Palestinian nationalism, states, in his new book, *The Palestinian National Renaissance*, “Ghassan Kanafani, an important Palestinian author, one of the leaders of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the author of its journal, *al-Hadaf*...”.<sup>40</sup>
3. Dr. Sara Ozacky-Lazar, a scholar of Middle Eastern studies and a senior researcher at the Van Leer Institute in Jerusalem, in an article on Ghassan Kanafani which she published in the daily newspaper *Maariv*: “Ghassan Kanafani was a 12-year-old boy when the *nakba* [catastrophe] of his people took place and he was uprooted from Akko, the city of his birth, to Lebanon. He was 36 years old when he was killed by Israel, because he belonged to the

<sup>35</sup> [http://kadhimmousawi.blogspot.co.il/2012/08/blog-post\\_4225.html](http://kadhimmousawi.blogspot.co.il/2012/08/blog-post_4225.html).

<sup>36</sup> <http://www.misrelgdida.com/reporters1/92741.html>.

<sup>37</sup> *al-Mawkef*, July 15, 2012, page 32. See <http://www.png.plo.ps/ar/cp/plugins/spaw/uploads/files/mawkef/almouqef%2010.pdf>.

<sup>38</sup> <http://redeagle.ahlamontada.com/t13721-topic>.

<sup>39</sup> Guy Bechor, *ibid.*, p. 81.

<sup>40</sup> Moshe Shemesh, *The Palestinian National Renaissance* [Hebrew] (Beersheba, Ben-Gurion University, 2012), p. 209.

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Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and edited its journal, *al-Hadaf* ('The Target')."<sup>41</sup>

4. The Israeli web site "News1" writes that the Palestinian author Ghassan Kanafani, a member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, who was eliminated by Israel in Beirut, was the editor of the periodical *al-Hadaf*. "[He] belonged to the Popular Front and edited its journal, *al-Hadaf* ('The Target')."<sup>42</sup>
5. The Israeli web site *Tapuz* ("Orange") writes that Ghassan Kanafani was born in Akko (Akka) in 1936. During the 1948 War, his family moved to Lebanon, where he later became a journalist, a teacher and a writer. Kanafani serves as the spokesperson for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and became the editor of the periodical *al-Hadaf*. He was killed in 1972 (when his car was blown up, apparently by Israel Defense Forces troops).<sup>43</sup>

## **II. Publications by the Popular Front in the periodical *al-Hadaf***

In order to examine the relationship between the journal *al-Hadaf* and the Popular Front organization, I performed a random examination of the contents of a number of issues, dating from 1988 and 2012. Following are the results:

### ***Issue No. 919 – 1988***

1. Cover: title in red, photograph of a funeral with the red *kaffiyeh* head coverings conspicuously emphasized.

Top headline: Habash holds important talks with Ceausescu.

Additional headline: 16th anniversary of Ghassan Kanafani's death.

2. Page 2: photographs of activity by leftist organizations throughout the world: South Africa, Salvador, New York, in support of the Palestinians.
3. Pages 4-5: an open letter by George Habash to the Palestinians.
4. Page 6: an article on the Popular Front delegation which visited Romania.
5. Page 7: an interview with George Habash.

<sup>41</sup> <http://www.nrg.co.il/online/archive/ART/236/897.html>.

<sup>42</sup> <http://www.news1.co.il/Archive/001-D-158920-00.html?tag=09-09-58>.

<sup>43</sup> <http://sf.tapuz.co.il/article-276-2-2217-17137/>.

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6. Page 13: an official announcement by the Popular Front.
7. A report on the meeting between the leadership of the Popular Front and the Democratic Front.
8. Pages 36-49 are dedicated to Ghassan Kanafani, a member of the political chamber and a spokesperson for the Popular Front and the first editor of *al-Hadaf*.

***Issue No. 917 – 1988***

1. Page 12: a statement by George Habash.
2. Page 13: an official announcement by the Popular Front.
3. Page 19: the discussion of the intifada in Yugoslavia.
4. Pages 22-23: an article on a Popular Front terrorist squad which infiltrated Israeli territory in the area of Mt. Hermon. Accompanying the article are pictures of the squad members holding weapons (Kalashnikov rifles). The article includes a description of the operation and the biographies of the participants, with the word *rafiq* (“Comrade”) emphasized before their names.
5. Page 25: an official announcement by the Popular Front – a call by Abu Ali Mustafa for the convocation of the Palestinian National Council.

***Issue No. 939 – 1988***

1. Cover page: festivities for the 21st anniversary of the establishment of the Popular Front. The cover page includes several photographs: a picture of George Habash; another picture of demonstrators waving a red flag; graffiti written in red; a demonstrator wearing a red-checked *kaffiyeh*; a Popular Front rally with a conspicuous display of the Popular Front emblems and flag. The main headline on the page, written in red, is: “And other year on the way to freedom and independence”.
2. Page 4: the logo of the paper, with the emblem of the Popular Front in the background.
3. Central article: an open letter from George Habash on the occasion of the 21st anniversary of the establishment of the organization.
4. Page 12: a detailed article on the occasion of the 21st anniversary of the Popular Front, including photographs of a demonstration with Popular Front signs.
5. Page 26: use of code words, such as the word *rafiq* (“Comrade”).

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6. Page 36: an article on the coup in Laos, in which the ideology is similar to that of the Popular Front.

***Issue No. 943 – 1989***

1. Cover: 30th anniversary of the revolution in Cuba.
2. Pages 6-7: an open letter by George Habash.
3. Page 16: a photograph and an article on Abu Ali Mustafa.
4. Page 21: comments by the Popular Front on American policy.
5. Page 22: a manifesto by the political chamber of the Popular Front.
6. Page 23: an official announcement by the Popular Front.
7. Page 25: an official manifesto by the Popular Front about the visit by Egyptian President Sadat to Israel.
8. An announcement by the Popular Front, opposing the cease-fire.
9. Page 27: a manifesto on behalf of Communist parties in the Arab world.
10. Pages 28-31: congratulations by organizations and parties to the Popular Front for its positions in the conflict.
11. Pages 46-47: a speech by George Habash in Libya.
12. Pages 50-51: an open letter by George Habash to President Gaddafi of Libya.
13. Pages 52-54: an article on the 30th anniversary of the coup in Cuba.

***Issue dated August 15, 2012<sup>44</sup>***

1. Page 3: the left side of the page features the Popular Front logo. The article on that page is dedicated to Abu Ali Mustafa, former Secretary General of the Popular Front, who was eliminated by Israel.
2. Page 4: an appeal by Ahmad Saadat, Secretary General of the Popular Front, who is imprisoned in Israel, to make all possible efforts in the struggle against Israel and especially on the issue of the political prisoners.

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<sup>44</sup> <http://www.pflp.ps/uploads/1346744511August%20AlHadaf%201453.pdf>.

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3. Page 5: an article on the Arab Nationalist Movement (*al-Qawmiyun al-Arab*), from which the Popular Front developed.
4. Page 7: an article by Azmi Khawaja, one of the heads of the Popular Front, about Abu Ali Mustafa.
5. Page 8: a position paper by the Popular Front with respect to the demand by the Palestinian Authority to raise the Value Added Tax.
6. Page 9: an additional article about Abu Ali Mustafa.
7. Pages 10-11: memories and biography of Abu Ali Mustafa.
8. Page 12: an article by Ghazi Sourani, one of the leaders of the Popular Front in Gaza.
9. Page 15: an article on the Association of Palestinian Women's Committees, which is a front organization for the Popular Front.
10. Pages 19-20: a discussion of the future of the Palestinian left with Daoud Talhami.
11. Pages 41-42 are devoted to ideological matters and to the leading philosophers of Marxist thought, primarily Carl Marx.
12. Page 43: an article on the author and cartoonist Naji al-Ali, who was posthumously claimed by the Popular Front as one of its members.
13. Pages 45-46 are devoted to Asad Salameh, "Abu Mansur", who was the military commander of the Popular Front in the Hebron area and was killed in 1968.

**III. Conclusion**

The journal *al-Hadaf* was founded in 1969 by the leadership of the Popular Front in order to disseminate the ideology of the organization, to serve as a mouthpiece for the organization's operations, and especially to recruit members and supporters to its ranks. At that time, the Internet did not yet exist, and neither did other tools of dissemination, such as the facsimile. A newspaper at the disposal of the organization was an organizational tool, and ideological tool, and primarily a tool for the dissemination of influence. Like other Palestinian organizations, the Popular Front also established a newspaper of its own. An organization of this size, with institutions and branches in the Arab countries, deployment throughout the Arab countries, and sympathizers in Europe, the United States and South Africa, needs a mass communications medium – whether a web site or a journal – which serves as a cohesive force among its sympathizers and members. The Popular Front, as an ideological organization, would not have

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succeeded without its ideological facet, which is reflected in the journal *al-Hadaf*. No wonder then, that all of the editors of *al-Hadaf*, throughout the generations, have been members of the political chamber of the Popular Front, and some of them have also been official spokespersons of the Popular Front.

The journal *al-Hadaf* contains no advertisements; this fact leads to the conclusion that it is not a commercial paper. The annual subscription fees and the income from sales of the newspaper do not cover its costs. In addition, according to discussions which I held in Jenin, Nablus and East Jerusalem, the newspaper is actually distributed free of charge. In order to set up an editorial board, maintain correspondents and photographers, print and distribute a newspaper and pay its employees a salary, large amounts of money are required. This leads to the conclusion that *al-Hadaf* is being funded by the PFLP.

The editors of the newspaper, throughout the years – Ghassan Kanafani, Bassam Abu Sharif, Jawad Aqal – have served or still serve as members of the political bureau of the Popular Front. The political bureau of the organization is its supreme leadership entity, which is headed by the Secretary General of the organization, and determines the organization's policy. The direct relationship between the leadership and the newspaper, including the fact that all of the editors have been members of the political bureau, is not mere happenstance; rather, this indicates the fact that the journal is a propaganda and communications medium of the Popular Front organization and an integral part of the Popular Front's public relations array.

The fact that the newspaper was inaugurated shortly after the establishment of the Popular Front is no coincidence. Neither is the location of the newspaper's editorial office – the Yarmuk refugee camp near Damascus; rather, this indicates the direct relationship between Syria and the Popular Front organization. It should be noted that the branch of the Popular Front in Gaza is located within the offices of the Popular Front, in the Information Department of the organization. This fact also shows the direct relationship between the Popular Front and the journal.

The photographs in the journal, like the symbols, the subjects of the articles and especially the official announcements by the Popular Front, link the journal to the Popular Front. Especially prominent are pictures of the organization's leaders, pictures of operations carried out by the Popular Front, and pictures of world leaders whose outlook is similar to that of the Popular Front, such as Fidel Castro and Nicolae Ceau escu.

The Arab and Palestinian media, academic publications, and residents in the Palestinian territories have all clearly indicated the relationship between the journal *al-Hadaf* and the Popular Front. I have cited examples of more than 20 instances from the media and from academia in this regard. Experts in Israel also recognize a direct relationship between the journal and the Popular Front.



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The content of the journal proves that its coverage and its articles are focused on the Popular Front. There are almost no references to other organizations, and there are no subjects in the paper which are not directly or indirectly related to the Popular Front.

In light of the examination which I have performed and my in-depth study of the issues of the paper, especially in the 1980s and throughout the past year; on the basis of my professional experience, which is founded on my work for the Israel Security Agency; my work as a journalist responsible for covering Palestinian society for the *Yedioth Ahronoth* newspaper; and my research at the Truman Institute of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, I hereby determine that *al-Hadaf* is the official journal of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

#### **IV. Summaries and Translations of Articles Published in al-Hadaf From 1999-2002**

In connection with my review of *al-Hadaf*, I reviewed the following articles published in the journal:

##### **Al Hadaf Vol. 1295 pp. 10-12 (Exhibit 1-A) July 25, 1999**

##### ***Dr. George Habash Congratulates President Saddam Hussein on the Anniversary of the July Revolution***

Dr. George Habash congratulates the president of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, on the occasion of the anniversary of the July Revolution, on behalf of the entire Palestinian people and on behalf of the Central Committee of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and all of the members of the organization. He states that the July Revolution constitutes an important milestone in the history of Iraq and the Arab nation, as part of the struggle against imperialism. Habash expresses his support of Hussein in light of the renewed attack on his country by the forces of imperialism, headed by the United States and its allies, Britain and world Zionism, which have adopted the goal of dividing up Iraq and striking against its national unity in order to exacerbate the rifts within the Arab nation. The author declares the support of the Palestinian people for the Iraqi people in that struggle against the enemies of the Arab nation, and primarily against the United States, and maintains that the Popular Front will continue to fight alongside all of the Palestinian entities in order to achieve their complete rights, including the right of return and the establishment of the State of Palestine, with al-Quds (Jerusalem) as its capital. Habash concludes by calling for strengthened relations between the two people and the two parties (the Popular Front and the Iraqi Baath Party).

**RONNI SHAKED - APPENDIX 1*****Dr. George Habash Congratulates Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika on Algerian Independence Day***

Dr. George Habash congratulates the president of Algeria, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, and his people on the occasion of the 37th Independence Day of their state, on behalf of the entire Palestinian people and on behalf of the Central Committee of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and all of the members of the organization. He expresses support of the measures which President Bouteflika is carrying out in order to achieve stability and growth in Algeria, and notes that the state has played an important role in Africa, the Arab world and the international arena, and has supported the Palestinian issue. Habash states that the Arab world and especially the Palestinian people are in need of a strong, stable Algeria, especially in light of the many challenges which they are facing as a result of the offensive by their enemies.

***Comrade Abu Ali Mustafa, on the "Opposite Direction" Program, Calls for Unity in Opposition to the Occupation and the Construction of the PLO Institutions on Comprehensive Democratic Foundations***

The Deputy Secretary General of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Abu Ali Mustafa, was a guest on the Al Jazeera Channel's "Opposite Direction" program on Tuesday, July 13, together with Yasser Abed Rabo, the Ministry of Culture and Communications in the Palestinian Authority. Mustafa called for the concentration of forces of the Palestinian people and the preservation of unity in light of the new developments in the diplomatic arena, as well as for the continued struggle against the Zionist occupation. He further declared that the PLO institutions should be constructed on new, democratic foundations, in order to restore its status as the supreme organization of the entire Palestinian people.

Mustafa believes that progress on the Syrian and Lebanese fronts of the Arab-Israeli struggle will have a good effect on the Palestinian front, and that there is no need to fear the diplomatic maneuvers by the Barak government, which are intended to provoke disputes among the Arab governments in order to attain diplomatic achievements. Mustafa expects the Palestinian leadership to learn from its diplomatic failures, starting with the Oslo Agreements, and to resume its role as a supportive home for the struggle of the Palestinian people. In that context, he mentioned the importance of democracy and of the involvement of the people in diplomatic issues.

In answer to the question of why he does not return to the Palestinian Authority, Mustafa replied that he attempted to do so in 1997 but was stopped by the Israeli authorities. He clarified that this is the right of every Palestinian, and that every Palestinian's individual struggle to return to his land should not diminish the struggle to achieve the overall right of return of the Palestinian people. In addition, Mustafa pointed out the importance of the Palestinian opposition as a

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political and social force, which is entitled to carry out its functions notwithstanding the agreements by the Palestinian Authority.

Mustafa went on to analyze Israel's policy since 1967 and claimed that it was based on three principles which had been determined by Yigal Allon and were also being implemented by Barak: no return to the borders of June 4; construction of the settlements; striving for a regional solution. Accordingly, Mustafa argued that it is no wonder that the Governments of Israel support the same diplomatic line, whether they are headed by Netanyahu or Barak, and reject the Palestinian demands on such issues as Jerusalem, the settlements and the right of return – thereby necessitating the continuation of the struggle, notwithstanding the agreements.

***Declaration to the Press / Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, July 21, 1999***

The spokesperson of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine confirmed that preparations are currently being made for a broad-scale Palestinian national dialogue, with a view to discussing the recent diplomatic developments and drawing the conclusions necessitated by the last five years. The spokesperson emphasized that it is necessary to unify the ranks in order to cope with the challenges which are facing the Palestinian people, and to reconstruct the PLO institutions and renew its activity in order to unify the people.

**Al Hadaf Vol. 1296 pp. 8-10 (Exhibit 1-B)  
August 22, 1999**

***Legitimate Questions and Long-Term Struggle  
by Abu Ali Mustafa, Deputy Secretary General of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine***

Abu Ali Mustafa attempts to answer the question: in light of the Oslo Agreements and all of the many changes which the Palestinian national movement has undergone in recent years – what is the state of the movement and what are the flaws from which it suffers?

Mustafa initially argues that the Palestinian public suffers from attempts to divert its attention from the problems in the national movement, most of which have to do with flaws in the diplomatic course, which must be opened for discussion by the general public. He laments the fact that the Palestinian side remains passive in the negotiations with the Israeli side and primarily responds to its actions and is dragged into non-essential issues; he believes it is necessary to adopt a comprehensive, all-embracing and long-term view of the struggle. Mustafa states that the Palestinian people will not achieve its objectives, or even part of them, without maintaining a protracted struggle which will change the balance of forces and will break the Zionist project, and that it is not right for the Palestinian people to give up most of its homeland

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in order to obtain a small part of it. He further believes that the entire Arab nation should rally to the struggle, because the Palestinian people will not succeed in it alone. According to his statement, even if the resistance has succeeded, in the last 50 years, in foiling Israel's attempts to deny the existence of the Palestinian identity and to extend its diplomatic, economic and security-related presence into the Arab sphere, it has also experienced painful failures. This, however, is not enough to prove that the way of negotiation is to be preferred over the way of struggle, certainly from such a position of inferiority relative to Israel. In his opinion, the situation of the Palestinian people cannot be compared to that of other liberation movements and other peoples which strove for independence; accordingly, the negotiations will not achieve the objectives which it achieved for those others but rather, will only perpetuate the recognition of Israel and the status quo and will prevent the Palestinian people from achieving its rights. On the other hand, the way of struggle has proved itself for both the Palestinian people and the Lebanese people; in fact, the Lebanese struggle has even succeeded in creating an internal rift within the Israeli public. As he sees it, the calls for a just and complete peace must stop, because no such peace can possibly be achieved with Israel. Therefore, it is necessary to continue the struggle on all levels and to launch a renewed intifada, which will include a struggle against Israel in the international, diplomatic, military and economic arenas.

With respect to the question of whether international law is likely to be of help to the Palestinian people, Mustafa argues that the importance of resolutions by the international community with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is dubious, because such resolutions are numerous and complicated and, in general, serve Israel's interests. This is why the PLO leadership has denied those resolutions, with the exception of UN Security Council Resolution 242, which it recognized at the Madrid Conference. Admittedly, those resolutions may be useful, both in order to direct criticism against the international community for not ensuring that they are carried out on the ground, and as a means of exerting diplomatic pressure on Israel. Mustafa, however, sees this as a tactical measure and not as a basis for diplomatic strategy.

Mustafa goes on to discuss the issue of unity of the Palestinian people and the flaws in the PLO. He states that the organization does not properly represent all Palestinians, does not properly promote the national project for the sake of which it was established, and has even been swallowed up by the Palestinian Authority. In his opinion, the framework and institutions of the organization should be reconstructed in such a way as to be detached from the institutions and undertakings of the Palestinian Authority, to represent the entire people and to promote the national program. Mustafa calls for a resumption of the activity of the Palestinian National Council on a democratic basis. As he sees it, it is necessary to promote the political unity of the Palestinian people, and even to involve the Palestinians in the 1948 territories and to preserve their connection to the national project.

**RONNI SHAKED - APPENDIX 1****Al Hadaaf Vol. 1298 pp. 3-12 (Exhibit 1-C)  
October 10, 1999*****Results of the Amman Meetings Between the Fatah Delegation and the Popular Front******Call for the Reconvening of the Palestinian National Council***

Pursuant to the national dialogue which began in Cairo in August 1999 between Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, discussions were held between the two organizations in the Jordanian capital on September 28. These discussions centered on ways to strengthen the national dialogue and on subjects which were raised by the Popular Front, including democratic reform of the PLO institutions, strengthening democracy in the Palestinian society and encouraging the action of Palestinian popular and professional unions. The talks were held in a pleasant atmosphere, and the parties agreed that steps should be taken toward renewing the activity and influence of the PLO, which had lost power in recent years in favor of the Palestinian Authority and pursuant to the Oslo Agreements, in order to unite the Palestinian people in the struggle against Israel.

Note: This brief column attempts to make it clear that the paper's preoccupation with the Palestinian issue, which has forced the affairs of the Arab world and international issues into a few brief pages, does not result from a belief that the latter are not important; rather, it results from the present stormy situation within the Palestinian Authority, especially with respect to the national dialogue. As for international affairs, the columnist points out that it is not possible to ignore the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the establishment of Communist China – not only because one-sixth of the world's population lives in that country, but also because it proves that Communism is not dead, notwithstanding the fall of the Soviet Union and the many difficulties which China has suffered over the years.

***Well Done, Arabs, Well Done!***

This column compares two cases of Arab opposition to Israel's relations with international American companies. In the first case, Burger King announced the granting of a concession to an Israeli company for the opening of a branch in Maaleh Adumim, but the opposition of the Arab world led Burger King to change its mind, claiming that the Israeli company had deceived it. In the second case, at a Disney exhibition honoring the millennium at Disney World in Orlando, Disney opened an Israeli stand which portrayed Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and ignored its Christian and Muslim history. The Arab world, headed by the Arab League, exerted pressure on Disney to change the situation, but did not act in a determined, organized and uniform manner. Arab entities, including shareholders in Disney, denied the protesters and the possibility of threatening to boycott the company, which accordingly did not grant all of their demands. The columnist considers this as an example of the problems in the Arab world due to which the world as a whole does not treat it with the proper degree of seriousness.

**RONNI SHAKED - APPENDIX 1****Research Study*****The Palestinians and the Talks on the So-Called Permanent Arrangement  
A Problematic Inheritance and Difficult Challenges  
by Ahmad Jabbar***

In this article, Ahmad Jabbar addresses the talks on the permanent arrangement between Israel and the Palestinians. Initially, however, he examines the implementation of the Sharm el-Sheikh Agreement as a harbinger of future developments. Jabbar determines that the Agreement, in actual fact, failed on such issues as security and prisoners, safe passage, the Gaza Port and the Israeli withdrawals from the territory of the Authority. The author describes the problematic nature of the talks on the Israeli withdrawals, and blames Israel for not being prepared to include in its calculations of the territories the West Bank territories which it has annexed, primarily in Jerusalem. On the subject of safe passage, Jabbar argues that not only has no passage which will form a geographic connection between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip yet been established, but there is even no territorial continuity within the West Bank itself. He criticizes Israel for not being willing to make this possible, in contravention of that set forth in the Oslo Agreements. With respect to the Israeli settlements, Jabbar directs criticism against the world and the United States for their support of Israel. In addition, in his opinion, it is obvious that Ehud Barak does not intend to dismantle the settlements, in light of the plans for construction in the territories and the coalition agreements of his government, especially with the National Religious Party.

Speaking of the talks on the subject of the permanent arrangement, which are supposed to deal with all of the essential issues, Jabbar determines that the Palestinians are approaching those talks from a position of grave inferiority, and it is therefore obvious that the talks will not give them the rights that they deserve. He directs severe criticism against the peace process and the Palestinian leadership for having transformed the issue of the refugees into just one more section of the negotiations, although, in his opinion, that issue should not even have been discussed but rather, should have constituted a clear precondition. He expresses his forceful objection to the proposal to grant citizenship to the refugees and criticizes entities in Lebanon which are interested in throwing out the Palestinian refugees without ensuring that they obtain the right of return.

Finally, Jabbar calls for unity within the ranks of the Palestinian people in order to cope with the challenges yet to come, and welcomes the dialogue between Fatah and the Popular Front.

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**The talks on the permanent arrangement:**

***A Long and Winding Marathon***

***by Abu Ali Hassan, a member of the Political Bureau of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine***

Abu Ali Hassan writes about the talks on the permanent arrangement. He initially makes it clear that the Popular Front does not intend to participate in those talks in any way whatsoever, because it does not believe that such an arrangement will preserve the rights of the Palestinian people, nor does it believe that it is possible to achieve the temporary goal of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders. He warns that the negotiations are a long and winding marathon, and that no one can tell how they will end; he states that Israel will not recognize the full rights of the Palestinian people without a long struggle on its part, which will change the balance of forces. Hassan points out that the talks on the subject of the temporary solutions, starting with the Oslo Agreement, went on for six years, and that Israel did not fulfill the undertakings which it made in those talks; accordingly, there can be no hope that the talks on the permanent arrangement will give rise to appropriate results.

Hassan goes on to clarify that the Popular Front does not recognize the Oslo Agreement, but does recognize its destructive effects and its influence on the present situation.

***Text of the Joint Statement of the Amman Conference Between the Delegations of the Fatah Central Committee and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine***

***Amman, September 28, 1999***

The statement sums up the conference which took place between the parties in Amman, at which they discussed measures aimed at the reinforcement of the national dialogue and the resumption of PLO activity. The statement calls upon all of the Palestinian factions to participate in the conferences of the Palestinian Central Council in order to promote the reconvening of the Palestinian National Council. The statement subsequently emphasizes the entitlement of the Palestinian people to a sovereign state with Jerusalem as its capital and to the right of return. In this context, the statement expresses opposition to the plans to grant citizenship to Palestinian refugees.

**A response to the article by Majed Abu Dayak in *Filastin al-Muslima* (“Muslim Palestine”)**

***Does Hamas Actually Object to Dialog?***

***by Khalil Jandawi***

Khalil Jandawi responds to an article by Majed Abu Dayak, which was published in the Hamas journal of September 1999, in which Abu Dayak criticized the talks between Fatah and the



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Popular Front in Cairo. Jandawi attacks Abu Dayak for his rhetorical devices and for the means in which he portrayed the contacts between the two parties, and claims that the article was hypocritical because Hamas itself participated in similar contacts. Jandawi emphatically denies that the Popular Front's desire for a rapprochement with Fatah stems exclusively from the Front's need for funds from the Palestinian Authority, in light of its difficult financial situation. He then goes on to present the Popular Front concept with respect to the Palestinian national dialogue and explains that the organization's aim is to contribute to the unification of the ranks within the Palestinian people and the reconstruction of the PLO institutions as a top-level framework which represents all of the Palestinians, in order to cope with the present challenges.

Finally, Jandawi provides an extremely long citation of official statements by Hamas members, from a period in which the movement maintained similar contacts with Fatah, in order to point out the hypocrisy of the criticism directed by Abu Dayak against the Popular Front.

**Al Hadaf 1298, p. 22, October 1999 (Exhibit 1-D)**

The article on this page deals with the issue of the Palestinian elections and the future structure of the Palestinian government. The article calls for:

1. Holding elections within and outside the territories – that is, all of the Palestinians should participate in them.
2. A call to hold the elections on a democratic basis.

The article sets forth a new structure for the authorities and institutions of the Legislative Council.

**Al Hadaf Vol. 1301 pp. 4-5 (Exhibit 1-E)  
December 26, 1999**

***A Public Political Declaration on the Occasion of the 32nd Anniversary of the Establishment of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the 12th Anniversary of the Outbreak of the Glorious Intifada  
by the Central Committee of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine***

The Central Committee of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine addresses the Palestinian people and the Arab nation on the occasion of the 32nd anniversary of the establishment of the Popular Front and the 12th anniversary of the outbreak of the intifada, and emphasizes its obligation to continue the struggle until the attainment of the national rights, and primarily the right of return and a sovereign state with Jerusalem as its capital. The Committee points out that the Front was established in response to the defeat in the 1967 War, and that the

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intifada broke out in response to the helplessness of the Arab world and the disregarding of the Palestinian people and its problem. It adds that the Palestinian issue is now facing a severe threat which is likely to perpetuate an makeshift solution which will not achieve any objectives whatsoever; in that context, it brings up the damage which was caused to the Palestinian struggle by the Oslo Agreement, because the Agreement included the surrender of its leadership to Israel's demands. According to the Committee, Israel is continuing, within the framework of the present negotiations, to steal Palestinian lands, to Judaize Jerusalem and to express contempt for the issue of the refugees.

The Committee expresses its opposition to the path laid out by the Madrid Conference, to the Oslo Agreement, and to any solution or arrangement, and emphasizes its obligation to the Palestinian national convention, the PLO national program and the struggle to achieve all of the rights of the Palestinian people. It calls upon the Palestinian leadership to terminate the negotiations with Israel and to bring the Palestinian issue back to the United Nations for deliberation.

The Committee believes that the PLO should be rebuilt as an all-encompassing, united framework for the Palestinian people, on the basis of clear political and organizational foundations which will be appropriate to the Palestinian national program, and that steps should be taken toward the establishment of a democratic, free, just and pluralistic regime. It calls upon the Arab nation tonight in the struggle against imperialistic Zionism and demands the release of all of the inmates in Israeli prisons.

**Al Hadaf Vol. 1302 pp. 4-13 (Exhibit 1-F)  
January 2000**

**Announcement on Behalf of the Political Bureau of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine**

***It Is Necessary to Conduct a Comprehensive Political and Organizational Critique of the Palestinian Course of Action in Recent Times***

The Political Bureau of the Popular Front warns against the attempts to force upon the Palestinian people an Israeli-American solution which will prevent it from achieving its rights in their entirety, and notes that the Oslo Agreements have harmed the Palestinian interests, have caused rifts within the Palestinian people and have weakened the PLO so that it no longer serves as an all-embracing framework for the people and its struggle. In light of the grave situation, the Bureau calls for a comprehensive political and organizational critique of the Palestinian course of action in recent times, especially after the Oslo Agreements. The Bureau demands the termination of the negotiations with Israel, which serve only the interests of the latter.

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The Bureau declares that the Palestinian issue constitutes the core of the Arab-Zionist conflict and accordingly, it cannot be resolved without being properly handled – without giving the Palestinians the right of return and enabling them to establish a sovereign state with Jerusalem as its capital. It goes on to state that Palestinian unity must be constructed around the struggle for the attainment of those rights, which cannot be waived under any circumstances, and calls for the reconstruction of the PLO institutions and the resumption of the activity of the Palestinian National Council.

The Bureau expresses solidarity with Lebanon and Syria in their struggle to restore the territories which Israel conquered from them.

***Palestine Between Dream and Reality: Have We Moved Toward It or Away From It?*  
by Dr. George Habash, Secretary General of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine**

George Habash examines whether the Palestinian people has moved closer to, or actually farther away from, achieving its dream of the state. He begins with the historical background in which he presents his version of the growth of the Zionist movement and its ties with the Western world, whereby he presents it as the spearhead of imperialism, the objective of which is to strike against the Arab project and to cause a rift between North Africa and the Arab countries of Asia. He criticizes the Western world and considers globalization as an additional means of imperialism, the intention of which is to do harm to independent peoples, as happened (as he says) in the Palestinian *nakba* [“Catastrophe”]. Habash attacks the Zionist worldview and states that it is based on denial of the other’s existence; he makes reference to the sentence “a land without a people for a people without a land”.

Habash expresses his opposition to the Oslo Agreement and believes that its purpose was to break the Palestinian people’s spirit of resistance; he criticizes the approach adopted by Israel, which views the Palestinians as an economic bridge to the Arab world. Habash also voices his opposition to the present negotiations with Israel and rules out the possibility that they will give rise to achievements for the Palestinians. In that context, he criticizes the Palestinian leadership, which, as he sees it, is conducting negotiations on the basis of narrow interests and not as part of the struggle of the Palestinian people.

The author goes on to present his version of historic events in the second half of the 20th century, starting from the establishment of the State of Israel and its wars against the Arab states, and up to the Iranian revolution and the fall of the Soviet Union, and presents the relationship of those events to the Arab world and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Habash criticizes Egypt for the peace agreement which it concluded with Israel and states that that agreement has not contributed to its economic growth, as it had been promised. Similarly, he claims that a permanent arrangement will not solve the distress of the Palestinian people. Finally, Habash proposes actions which the Palestinian people must take in order to succeed in its struggle, and

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states that the struggle is still going on and must be won, notwithstanding the inferior position of the Arab world and the Palestinian people today.

***A Quick Analysis of the Flaws in Palestinian Policy***  
***by Abu Ali Mustafa, Deputy Secretary General of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine***

Mustafa examines the flaws in Palestinian policy and proposes a number of aspects, according to which it is important to examine them. Among other things, he refers to the need to define the scope and dimensions of the struggle against Israel and the nature of the dispute with it and to define the nature of the present period of the dispute – whether it is a period of Palestinian struggle for the liberation of the people, or a period of peace. According to his argument, in the eyes of the Arab world and the entire world, it is a period of peace, and this is what enables Israel to continue to oppress the Palestinian people. An additional aspect which Mustafa presents is the distinction between temporary tactics and long-term strategy. In his opinion, the Palestinian leadership has difficulty distinguishing between these two concepts, and some Palestinian factions believe that the present period represents the end of the struggle, and not only one stage within it. Another aspect to which Mustafa refers is the functioning of the Palestinian Authority as an entity with no real sovereignty, no Constitution and no law and order – a situation which is harmful to the Palestinian people and its struggle. Finally, he addresses the tension between the national interests of the Palestinian people and the overall interests of the Arab nation, and criticizes Arab entities that are striving toward normalization of relations with Israel at the expense of the Palestinian struggle.

**Al Hadaaf Vol. 1302 pp. 65-67, 106-108 (Exhibit 1-G)**  
**January 2000**

***The Holocaust: the Horror Story of the Century – How Long?***  
***by Ali Hason (Syria)***

Hason refers to a news item which he heard a short time before, according to which the British Foreign Secretary visited Israel and recalled the memory of the Holocaust victims. The item reminded him of a tour of East Germany in which he participated during his high school studies, when he visited a Nazi extermination camp. The writer addresses the subject of the Holocaust and briefly presents researchers who have denied that it ever took place, especially Robert Faurisson of France and Jurgen Graf of Switzerland. Hason raises some of their arguments, cites various elements of proof that the Holocaust never took place, and presents his version of the history of the Jewish people in World War II.

Hason goes on to describe the attitude of the State of Israel toward the subject of the Holocaust; he makes reference to the reparation agreement with Germany and claims that Israel uses the

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subject in order to achieve unity among the Jewish people and as a tool for the exertion of diplomatic pressure in order to ensure the world's support of its actions. The author ends with a quote from Jurgen Graf's book, *Holocaust Under the Microscope* [known in English as *Holocaust on the Test Stand*], translated by the Iraqi author Jawad Bashara, who considers the Holocaust as both a source of strength and the weak point of the Zionist movement, and accordingly calls for an attack on this subject.

**On the occasion of the 32nd anniversary of the establishment of the Popular Front and the 12th anniversary of the intifada:**

***Mass Public Celebrations in the Palestinian [West] Bank***

The article reviews the events in the West Bank in commemoration of the 32nd anniversary of the establishment of the Popular Front and the 12th anniversary of the intifada.

Tulkarem: The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine held a public rally on December 6, led by Popular Front members Jamal Barham and Alam al-Hamed Allah and with the participation of public personages, other Popular Front members and many local residents. The rally included an appearance by the artist Amjad Arar and speeches by politicians: Abbas Zaki, a member of the Fatah Central Committee; Kayes Abd al-Rahim, a member of the political bureau of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine; Abd al-Majid Hamdan, a member of the General Secretariat of the Palestinian People's Party; and Abu Ali Mustafa, Deputy Secretary General of the Popular Front. The latter called for the resumption of the way of struggle, notwithstanding the damage which was caused as a result of the Oslo Agreements; he advocated terminating the negotiations with Israel, holding a Palestinian dialogue, adhering to the Palestinian national convention and program, reconstructing the PLO institutions on a democratic basis, and eliminating corruption within the Palestinian Authority.

Ramallah: The Popular Front in Ramallah held a number of activities in the area to commemorate the anniversary of its establishment and of the intifada. These activities included the decoration of streets in the cities and villages with Palestinian Authority and Popular Front flags, posters and propaganda slogans, the installation of loudspeakers and the playing of music. In addition, a festive procession, with the participation of people wearing masks, took place in Ramallah; the participation included the burning of Israeli, American and British flags and outcries against the Oslo Agreements and in favor of continuing the struggle. The rally at the end of the procession was attended by Front members Abu Lili, Amar Asaf and others, along with delegations from other parties, such as FIDA [the Palestinian Democratic Union] and the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front. Among the speakers at the rally were Salah Raafat, Sheikh Abu Massab Hassan Yusuf, Abd al-Jawad Salah and a member of the Popular Front, Bashir al-Hiri.

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Hebron District: On December 4, 1999, a procession took place with the participation of people wearing masks. In the course of the procession, Popular Front members expressed their opposition to the granting of citizenship to Palestinian refugees in exile and their support of the right of return; pictures of *shahids* were displayed and an Israeli flag was burned. The procession was given local and worldwide media coverage, including by Israel Television. At a rally that followed the procession, the speakers included Popular Front members Badran Jabbar and Sara Amtir, along with speakers from other organizations. In an additional event, which was held on December 11 with the participation of representatives from various parties, Abbas Zaki delivered a speech.

Nablus District: On December 24, 1999, a procession took place with the participation of local public personages, members of academia and educators, along with Popular Front members Yusuf Abd al-Haq and Abu Ali Mustafa. Mustafa reviewed the struggle between the Palestinian movement and the Zionist movement and Israel, and expressed opposition to the arrangement and to recognition of the Zionist entity.

Jenin District: On December 17, 2000, the Popular Front held an open conference in Arabeh with the participation of Abu Ali Mustafa, Kayes Abd al-Karim Abu Lili, Salah Raafat and Abbas Zaki, who discussed the diplomatic situation, presented the positions of their parties and answered questions of the public.

**Al Hadaf 1308, July 31, 2000 (Exhibit 1-H)**

The lead article emphasizes the failure of the Camp David Conference: “Our people has proved once more that it demands to obtain all of its rights. The members of our people have said [that they are] prepared for sacrifice in exchange for obtaining their rights.” The conclusion of the article from the failure of the conference is that the Palestinians must prepare themselves for a new round of confrontations with Israel.

The announcement summing up the sixth Popular Front Conference, which was held in the territories and in Syria. Dr. George Habash announced that he did not have the intention of running again in the elections for the position of Secretary General.

Following are the important resolutions passed at the conference:

- 1) Opposition to the continuation of negotiations, based on the argument that since the Madrid Conference and its continuation in Oslo, the Palestinians have not achieved their objective. The necessary response by the PLO is the declaration of an independent state, with no negotiations with Israel.